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The butcher-on-the-bus is a rhetorical device or hypothetical phenomenon that is often
used to illustrate how recognition decisions can be based on different memory processes
(Mandler, 1980). The phenomenon describes a scenario in which a person is recognized
but the recognition is accompanied by a sense of familiarity or knowing characterized by
an absence of contextual details such as the person’s identity. We report two recognition
memory experiments that use signal detection analyses to determine whether this phe-
nomenon is evidence for a recollection plus familiarity model of recognition or is better
explained by a univariate signal detection model. We conclude that there is an interaction
between confidence estimates and remember-know judgments which is not explained
fully by either single-process signal detection or traditional dual-process models.
Keywords: episodic memory, recognition, signal detection, context, faces
INTRODUCTION
The butcher-on-the-bus is a rhetorical device or hypothetical phe-
nomenon that is often used to illustrate how recognition decisions
can be based on different memory processes (Mandler, 1980). The
phenomenon describes a scenario in which a person is recognized
but the recognition is accompanied by a sense of familiarity or
knowing characterized by an absence of contextual details such
as the person’s identity as a butcher. A great many studies have
examined how context facilitates recognition, and a great many
studies have examined the subjective experience of remembering
(Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000) and whether or not
this provides evidence that recognition is composed of multiple
processes (Dunn, 2004). A few studies have examined the subjec-
tive experience of remembering in face recognition (Brandt et al.,
2003). A few studies have even considered whether context affects
the subjective experience of recognition in different ways and thus
dissociates recollection and familiarity (Macken, 2002), but only
one previous study has done so in face recognition (Gruppuso
et al., 2007). That is, to our knowledge there is only one published
experimental report that the butcher-on-the-bus as a rhetori-
cal device might actually exist as an experimental phenomenon.
Although this report did demonstrate that context influences the
subjective experience of recognizing a face the results were equiv-
ocal in the sense that a number of different models of recognition
memory could explain the data, including single-process models.
In the first of the two experiments reported here we aim to first
replicate the effect of context on the face recognition and the asso-
ciated reports of remembering. In order to discriminate between
the single and dual-process explanations of this effect we apply
a signal detection analysis that was not used by Gruppuso et al.
(2007). In the second experiment we test the claim in the recogni-
tion memory literature that the two proposed memory processes
differ in that recollection encodes context but familiarity does not.
Here we provide data that suggests that the butcher-on-the-bus
phenomenon may well be indicative of two underlying memory
systems, but that this can only be explained by two continuous
underlying signals, not by threshold models of recollection.
Tulving (1985) argued that if different memory processes give
rise to different phenomenal experiences it is reasonable that the
relative contribution of those memory processes to a decision
could be estimated by simply asking people to report their sub-
jective experience of remembering. A large literature subsequently
developed that showed dissociations between estimates of recol-
lection and familiarity based on the proportions of recognition
judgments (and recalled items) that participants reported were
accompanied by the experience of remembering or of knowing.
For example, low frequency words are more likely to be recognized
than high frequency words and this is more likely to be accompa-
nied as an experience of recollection (Gregg et al., 2006). A similar
effect is observed in face recognition when distinctive faces elicit
more remember than know responses (Brandt et al., 2003). That is,
we are more likely to recollect a distinctive face than an indistinct
one that may feel familiar. Unsurprisingly the effect is also true of
distinctive forenames (Brandt et al., 2006).
The crux of the butcher-on-the-bus as a rhetorical device lies
in the predicted effect of context on the subjective experience of
remembering and by inference on recollection and familiarity.
Context effects have typically been studied in word recognition.
Words presented in the same or similar context as the study
episode are more likely to be recognized or recalled than words
tested in a novel context (Godden and Baddeley, 1980; Ruther-
ford, 2004). Moreover, word recognition in a context different to
that of the study episode reduces the contribution of recollection
to the recognition judgments (Macken, 2002).
Of course context can take a number of different forms
(McGeoch, 1932), so in order to control experimentally the asso-
ciation between face and context a number of researchers have
turned to associative recognition as the paradigm of choice. In
an early study Watkins et al. (1976) presented pairs of faces at
study and at test. Recognition accuracy was reduced at test when
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the target faces were presented with a novel context face (see also
Winograd and Rivers-Bukeley, 1977). Watkins et al. observed the
same effect when faces were paired with brief personal descrip-
tions of the person. Similar effects are also observed by changing
the backgrounds behind the faces (Davies and Milne, 1982). A
striking example of this was reported by Rainis (2001) who found
that emotionally arousing contexts can lead to a reduction in
accuracy for negative contexts (e.g., a concentration camp) or an
increase in accuracy for positive contexts (e.g., paradise island).
Some studies have even shown differences in event related poten-
tials (ERPs) when faces are recognized and their paired contextual
details are also retrieved compared to when faces are recognized
but the contextual details are not retrieved (Yovel and Paller, 2004).
These different ERP signals are indicative of different retrieval
processes but do not necessarily imply differences in the subjective
experience of retrieval or indeed underlying processes.
To date however only one study has directly tested whether
context affects the subjective experience of remembering in face
recognition (Gruppuso et al., 2007). In this experiment partici-
pants saw a series of faces paired with scenes. At test the target
faces were presented with either the same context scene as at study,
a switched scene, or a novel scene. The distractor faces were pre-
sented with either novel or old scenes. As expected recognition
accuracy was more reliable when old faces were presented at test
with the same context scene as at study, relative to when the con-
text scene was switched or new. The key question is how context
affected the subjective experience that accompanied the recogni-
tion judgments. Gruppuso et al. reported that the recollection-
based memory was more accurate when the context was the same
compared to when it was switched or new, but there was no such
effect on familiarity-based memory. These results do indeed sug-
gest that context facilitates face recognition and influences the
subjective experience associated with recognition. The corollary
of this effect is that if a face is recollected then the context in which
the face was originally stored in memory (i.e., the source) should
also be available for retrieval, but if a face merely feels familiar then
source memory should be less accurate or absent altogether.
According to most dual-process models recollection is dis-
tinct from familiarity not only in terms of phenomenology but
also in that it encodes context. Indeed studies that show that a
reinstatement of study context at test facilitates memory do so
presumably because in those models the context cues retrieval.
Alternatively a signal detection model might assume that this
merely increases the signal strength. An alternative way to con-
ceptualize the butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon is that it is an
example of strong familiarity-based recognition in the absence of
the retrieval of source information, namely context.
In a series of five word recognition studies Perfect et al. (1996)
examined whether remember responses are associated with bet-
ter source memory than know responses. The source contexts
included temporal order, list identity, spatial location, and visual
form (i.e., font and font size). In only one of these experiments was
source memory reliably greater than chance for items reported as
know responses. More recently Dudukovic and Knowlton (2006)
used a paired-associate procedure. After a 10-min retention inter-
val there was a recognition test for one of the words in each pair and
participants were asked to report their experience of remembering
for each decision. The participants were re-tested after a 7-day
retention interval and asked to report contextual details such as
the location of the word in the pair or the color of the image.
Remember responses were associated with the retrieval of contex-
tual details but know responses were not. In a later study that used
the same materials the participants were able to indicate the color
of the pictures that accompanied the target words and whether the
target had appeared as the left-hand or the right-hand item of the
study pair (Eldridge et al., 2005). Moreover, although responses
were more accurate for remember responses, accuracy was well
above chance for both remembering and knowing.
Wais et al. (2008) report an experiment in which participants
studied nouns presented on screen either in blue or in red, and
either above or below the center of the computer screen. They also
reported that context accuracy for know responses was greater
than chance suggesting that familiarity is not distinguished from
recollection in terms of its encoding of context (see also Wixted
and Mickes, 2010). Although we know of no study that has exam-
ined whether context or source memory for faces can distinguish
between recollection and familiarity a recent series of studies Bell
and Buchner (Buchner et al., 2009; Bell and Buchner, 2010, 2011)
have shown that source memory (i.e., context information), but
not recognition accuracy for faces is influenced by their emotional
valence. Unfortunately these studies did not determine whether
source memory occurred only for remember judgments or for
know judgments as well.
Signal detection theory provides an elegant model of memory
and also provides analytic techniques to determine if a decision
is based on more than one source of information. That is, signal
detection theory can be used to estimate the relative contributions
of recollection and familiarity to recognition memory indepen-
dently of subjective reports of remembering (Yonelinas, 1994); and
can also be used as an alternative model that does not require two
underlying memory processes (Donaldson, 1996). Signal detec-
tion theory is therefore an ideal paradigm to test the assumption
that the butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon, should it exist as a
real laboratory phenomenon and not merely a rhetorical device,
really does discriminate between single and dual-process models
of recognition memory. To test the signal detection model the
participants are asked to report how confident they are in each
decision. These confidence ratings are then used to plot receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curves. The coordinates of the
ROC curves can be transformed into z-scores, and a regression
line fitted. The regression line describes the form of the zROC
and this discriminates between a dual-process account of recog-
nition and a single-process account. For instance, a zROC with
a regression line with a slope close to 1 implies that the recogni-
tion judgments were based on a single underlying dimension in
which the signal and noise distributions had similar variance. If,
as is often the case, the slope of the regression line deviates from 1
then this implies that the ROC is asymmetric, and that the signal
distribution has a narrower variance than the noise distribution.
However, this only implies that the signal distribution has more
than one component if there is also a quadratic component to
the regression line (i.e., two slopes). Thus an independent test of
whether context facilitates recollection in face recognition is to
look for a larger quadratic component in the zROC curves when
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faces are presented with the same context as the study episode com-
pared to when they are presented with different or new contexts
(for a fuller description see Tunney and Bezzina, 2007; Tunney,
2010).
Wixted and Mickes (2010) have recently proposed an extension
to the signal detection model adding recollection as an additional
orthogonal process, but one which is also based upon a continu-
ous signal detection scale. Importantly, it assumes that confidence
in old-new judgments is always predicated upon the sum of the
two signals. This means it maintains the same predictions as the
univariate signal detection model described above but predicts
a different mechanism for remember and know judgments. The
model assumes that a remember response is made when the sig-
nal strength from the recollection process passes a criterion point.
This means that the model still accounts for instances where the
summative signal is high, but the recollection signal alone is low,
or at least not high enough to pass the remember criterion. These
instances result in high confidence familiarity responses: the classic
butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon.
In the experiments that follow we explore the butcher on the
bus and ask whether it is truly a phenomenon that discriminates
between models of recognition memory. Experiment 1 replicates
the procedure reported by Gruppuso et al. (2007) that demon-
strated context effects on the subjective experience of recognizing
faces. The only adjustment to the paradigm that is required to use
SDT as a test of the dual-process account is to ask the participants
to report how confident they are in each recognition decision.
In Experiment 2 we ask whether recollection and familiarity are
characterized by differences in the retrieval of contextual (source)
details.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-nine members of the University of Nottingham community
volunteered to take part in this experiment in return for course
credit. Their mean age was 21 years (SD= 0.64). Thirty-one were
female and 18 were male. All had normal or corrected to normal
vision.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of color photographs of face-scene pairs (see
Figure 1). The faces were 96 naturalistic portrait photographs of
different people collected by an Internet search. Half of these were
females and half were males. These were cropped to exclude as
much contextual information such as clothing and background
locations as possible. The estimated age of the faces were 42 years
old (SD= 13.56) and for 39 years (SD= 11.50) for males and
females, respectively. The oldest were around 65 years and the
youngest 20 years. The majority (81%) were judged to be of
European-origin, 7% Asian-, 6% Chinese-, and 5% African-origin.
Ninety-six photographs of a variety of scenes such as landscapes
(43), building interiors (22), and exteriors (23) were also col-
lected using the Internet. The remaining eight scenes such as a
tennis court or market stall didn’t fall into any obvious category.
Each face-context pair was then randomly created. There were no
explicit exclusion or inclusion criteria for the faces other than that
the photographs were of a sufficient resolution. Similarly there
FIGURE 1 | Example paired associate stimuli.
were no criteria with respect to the scenes other than that they
were unfamiliar in the sense that although they could be named
by super-ordinate category (e.g., mountain), they could not be
named as a specific instance by the experimenters (e.g., Snowdon).
Forty-eight faces were randomly selected as study items. Half
of these were male and half were female. These were paired with a
unique scene. There were six test conditions: the stimuli in the old
face–old scene (OO) condition consisted of 12 of the study item.
In the old face–switched scene (OS) a different set of 12 faces from
the study list were paired with a set of 12 scenes that had appeared
in the study list but had been paired with a different face. The old
face–new scene (ON) condition included the remaining 24 faces
from the study list paired with a scene that had not appeared in
the study list. Forty-eight foils were created by pairing faces that
had not appeared in the study list with either a scene that had
appeared in the study list (new face–old scene, NS) or one that had
not (new face–new scene, NN).
Procedure
The participants were told they would be shown a series of face-
scene pairs and that they would be asked to rate how associated
they believed the face-scene pair to be on a six-point scale ranging
from strongly unassociated to strongly associated. The participants
were not informed that they would have to recognize the faces
in the test that followed. There was a 15-min retention interval
between the study and test periods. Before the test phase began,
the participants were told they would be shown another set of
face-scene pairs, and that they are to make judgments only on
whether they recognize the faces, not the scenes. The recognition
judgments were based on a six-point scale ranging from sure-new
to sure-old. Whenever the participants responded with one of the
three old buttons they were then asked also to indicate whether
their recognition decision was based on recollection or familiar-
ity by clicking buttons marked remember or know, respectively.
The order in which the test items appeared was randomized. To
ensure that the participants understood the distinction between
remember and know responses we used a modified version of the
“standard instructions”(Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000)
as follows:
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“In this part of the experiment you will see some more
faces and scenes. Some of the faces and scenes have already
appeared in the study part of the experiment. You are now
asked to make judgments on whether you have seen the face
before. You are to make judgments about the faces only and
not the scene. On the screen below you will see six buttons
marked sure-old, fairly sure-old, guess-old, guess-new, fairly
sure-new, and sure-new. Please click one of the buttons to
indicate whether you think that you have seen the face dur-
ing the study part of the experiment and how confident you
are in that judgment. Recognition memory is associated with
two different kinds of awareness. Quite often recognition
brings back to mind something you recollect about what it
is that you recognize, as when, for example, you recognize
someone’s face, and perhaps remember talking to this per-
son at a party the previous night. At other times recognition
brings nothing back to mind about what it is you recognize,
as when, for example, you are confident that you know you
recognize them, because of strong feelings of familiarity, but
you have no recollection of seeing this person before. You do
not remember anything about them. These kinds of aware-
ness are associated with recognizing the faces you saw earlier.
Sometimes when you recognize one of the faces in the exper-
iment, recognition will bring back to mind something you
remember thinking about when the face appeared then. You
recollect something you consciously experienced at the time.
But sometimes recognizing a face will not bring back to mind
anything you remember about seeing it then. Instead the face
will seem familiar, so that you feel confident it was one that
you have seen before, even though you don’t recollect any-
thing you experienced when you saw it then. For each face
that you recognize, you will be asked to indicate your experi-
ence of remembering. Please then click the remember button,
if recognition is accompanied by some recollective experi-
ence, or the know button, if recognition is accompanied by
strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of any recollective
experience. Click OK when you are ready to proceed.”
RESULTS
The proportions of items in each condition endorsed as old
are shown in Figure 2. Endorsements to old (hits) and to new
items (false alarms) were entered into separate repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs. There was a main effect of context on hits,
F(2, 96)= 39.36, MSE< 0.01, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.45, due to an
increase in endorsements to OO items compared to OS items,
F(1, 48)= 65.27, MSE< 0.01, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.58. There was no
difference in endorsements to OS compared with ON items, F(1,
48)= 0.11, MSE< 0.01, p= 0.75, η2p < 0.01. There was no effect
of context on false alarms, F(2, 96)= 0.37, MSE< 0.01, p= 0.55,
η2p < 0.01. These data clearly show that face recognition is more
accurate when the test items are presented with the same context
as the study period. However, there appeared to be no increase in
recognition accuracy when the context was switched compared to
when the context was new.
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF REMEMBERING
Does context affect the subjective experience of remembering?
The proportions of remember and know responses are shown in
FIGURE 2 |The proportions of items in each condition endorsed as old
in Experiment 1.
Figure 3 for each condition. The upper panel shows hits and the
lower panel shows false alarms. Also shown are familiarity esti-
mates made using the independence assumption (Jacoby et al.,
1997). These data were entered into separate ANOVAs. There was a
main effect of context on the proportion of remember responses to
studied faces, F(2, 96)= 49.15, MSE= 0.01, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.51.
This was because old faces with their studied context scene elicited
more remember responses than old faces with a switched con-
text, F(1, 48)= 75.46, MSE< 0.01, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.61. However,
old faces seen with a switched context did not elicit reliably more
remember responses than old faces seen with a new context, F(1,
48)= 0.18, MSE< 0.01, p= 0.67, η2p < 0.01. There was no effect
of context on remember false alarms (new faces–switched scene
vs. new faces–new scene: F(1, 48)= 0.96, MSE< 0.01, p= 0.33,
η2p = 0.02). This pattern of results nicely demonstrates the
butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon in the laboratory. That is, seeing
faces in their original context elicits both more accurate recogni-
tion and a feeling of recollection than seeing faces in different or
novel contexts.
We next examined the effects of context on familiarity assuming
both exclusivity and independence of processes. There was a main
effect of context on the proportion of correct know responses, F(2,
96)= 4.60, MSE< 0.01, p= 0.01, η2p < 0.09. This was because
fewer know responses were made to old faces seen with their
studied scenes than to old faces seen with switched scenes, F(1,
48)= 6.56, MSE< 0.02, p< 0.02, η2p < 0.12. There was no reli-
able difference in the proportion of correct know responses made
to old faces seen with switched scenes and old faces seen with novel
scenes, F(1, 48)< 0.01, MSE= 0.01, p= 0.94, η2p < 0.01. Context
had no reliable effect on the proportions of know false alarms, F(1,
48)= 0.05, MSE< 0.01, p< 0.02,η2p < 0.01. The effects of context
on estimates of familiarity assuming independence revealed a
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FIGURE 3 |The proportions of remember and know responses for each
condition in Experiment 1.
different pattern of results. There was a main effect of context,
F(2, 96)= 18.90, MSE< 0.04, p= 0.01, η2p < 0.28, but in contrast
to the pattern observed assuming exclusivity, this was due to an
increase in familiarity when old faces were seen with their original
scene, F(1, 48)= 22.49, MSE= 0.08, p= 0.01, η2p < 0.32. There
was no difference in familiarity when old faces were seen with
switched contexts compared to when they were seen in new con-
texts, F(1, 48)= 0.57, MSE= 0.07, p= 0.46, η2p = 0.01. Although
these two patterns differ, and one might question which assump-
tion to believe, the real problem for the dual-process interpretation
of the butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon is that the feeling of famil-
iarity doesn’t appear to increase when faces are seen in switched
contexts relative to when they are seen in novel contexts. The
FIGURE 4 | Effects of context on estimates of recollection and
familiarity in Experiment 1.
butcher-on-the-bus phenomena describes a situation in which a
familiar person is seen out of context and thus, although retrieval
fails, they nonetheless feel familiar. This does not apparently occur
under our laboratory conditions for either studied or unstudied
faces.
We next estimated the effects of context on the sensitivity of
different memory “processes” using the statistic d ′ (see Figure 4).
To do so the hit rates for faces presented with either studied or
switched contexts were compared with the false alarm rates for
new faces presented with switched contexts (old faces–old scenes
vs. new faces–switched scenes, and old faces–switched scenes vs.
new faces–switched scenes), and the hit rates for faces presented
with new scenes were compared to new faces presented with
new scenes (old faces–new scenes vs. new faces–new scenes). We
used the standard formulas (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991) to
compute sensitivity [d ′= z(hits)− z(false alarms)], and criterion
placement [c =−0.5× z(hits)+ z(false alarms)]. To prevent val-
ues of 1 and 0 in the hit and false alarm rates we used the Snodgrass
and Corwin (1988) correction in which a constant of 0.5 is added
to each cell frequency and is then divided by n+ 1. There was an
effect of context on the sensitivity of recollection, F(2, 96)= 38.63,
MSE= 0.13, p< 0.01,η2p = 0.45, this was because recollection was
more sensitive when old faces were presented with the same con-
text scene as at study compared to when the context was switched,
F(1, 48)= 76.19, MSE< 0.18, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.61. Faces seen
with switched contexts did not result in an increase in the sensitiv-
ity of recollection compared to old faces seen with new contexts,
F(1, 48)= 0.21, MSE< 0.36, p= 0.65, η2p < 0.01. There was a
similar pattern of data for the effects of context of the sensitivity
of the IRK estimates of familiarity, F(2, 96)= 15.07, MSE= 2.17,
p< 0.01, η2p = 0.24, that was due to an increase in sensitivity
www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 208 | 5
Tunney et al. The butcher-on-the-bus
when old faces were presented with their studied context scenes
compared to when they were presented with switched contexts,
F(1, 48)= 14.61, MSE= 5.97, p< 0.01, η2p < 0.23. Sensitivity was
not reliably higher when old faces were seen with switched con-
texts than when they were seen with new contexts, F(1, 48)= 1.33,
MSE= 0.79, p= 0.25, η2p = 0.03. This latter pattern of results dif-
fers from that reported by Gruppuso et al. (2007) who found no
increase in the sensitivity of familiarity for faces seen in studied
contexts.
Context also had a reliable effect on criterion placement (c)
for remember responses, F(2, 96)= 45.95, MSE= 0.25, p< 0.01,
η2p = 0.49. Participants were adopted a more liberal criterion
for remember responses when old faces were presented with
the same context scene as at study (M = 0.49, SD= 0.25) com-
pared to when the context was switched (M = 0.76, SD= 0.25),
F(1, 48)= 76.20, MSE= 0.22, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.61. There was
no difference in the remember criterion placement when old
faces were seen with switched contexts compared to old faces
seen with new contexts (M = 0.76, SD= 0.29), F(1, 48)< 1.0.
A smaller effect of context was observed on criterion place-
ment for know responses F(2, 96)= 3.49, MSE= 0.38, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.07. Participants were more conservative in the criterion
placement for know response when old faces were presented with
the same context scene as at study (M = 1.25, SD= 0.33) com-
pared to when the context was switched (M = 1.17, SD= 0.36),
F(1, 48)= 5.55, MSE= 0.03, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.10, but not
when old faces were seen with switched contexts compared to
old faces seen with new contexts (M = 1.15, SD= 0.34), F(1,
48)< 1.0.
RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
If the butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon represents a dissocia-
tion between recollection and familiarity-based memory then this
should be apparent not just in the subjective experience of remem-
bering, but also in the ROC averaged over each participant. The
precise form of the ROC discriminates between the possible inter-
pretations of the effect of context on recognition. If recognizing a
face in a studied context simply increases the overall signal strength
of those faces then we should see an increase in the asymme-
try of the ROC curve as the variance in the signal distribution
increases. On the other hand, if context serves to cue the retrieval
of the face from recollection (as opposed to increasing its sig-
nal strength) then we should see a quadratic component in the
slope of the zROC curve (Glanzer et al., 1999). To test this we
first constructed ROC for each participant based on their confi-
dence ratings, and a corresponding zROC. The x and y coordinates
for each comparison were the same as the remember and know
responses. As a measure of symmetry we found the standardized
regression coefficient (β) of the zROC for each participant. We
then looked for a quadratic constant (bx) in the regression. The
average ROC and zROC curves for each condition are shown in
Figure 5. The average standardized regression coefficients (β) and
the average quadratic components (bx) for each condition are
shown in Table 1.
The standardized regression coefficients for all three zROCs
were reliably less than 1. But none of the quadratic constants were
greater than 0. When old faces were seen with studied contexts the
FIGURE 5 | Receiver operating characteristics for each condition in
Experiment 1. (A) shows the average ROC and (B) shows the z-transform.
asymmetry was greater than when old faces were seen with new
contexts, t (48)=−2.24, p= 0.03), but none of the other compar-
isons approached significance. This pattern suggests that context
serves to increase the inequity in variance of the signal and noise
distributions that causes the asymmetry in the zROC and that
it has a continuous effect across the scale of confidence judg-
ments. This matches both the univariate signal detection model
and Wixted and Mickes’ dual-process extension of it.
In many respects the Butcher-on-the-Bus is defined by a strong
feeling of familiarity without the retrieval of any contextual detail
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Table 1 | Distribution of responses for each level of confidence and each item type in Experiment 1.
Remember Know New
Sure Fairly sure Unsure Sure Fairly sure Unsure Sure Fairly sure Unsure
Old face–old scene 408 20 5 24 52 31 15 19 14
Old face–switched scene 290 36 3 18 66 52 36 48 39
Old face–new scene 582 54 13 45 139 90 85 107 61
New face–switched scene 12 8 1 1 19 50 595 348 142
New face–new scene 16 7 4 4 26 42 623 334 120
FIGURE 6 | Receiver operating characteristics for remember and know
responses for each condition in Experiment 1. (A) Old face–old scene vs.
new face–switched scene, (B) old face–switched scene vs. new face
switched scene, (C) old face–new scene vs. new face–new scene.
(Wixted and Mickes, 2010). In the laboratory this would be mea-
sured as know responses made with high confidence. The raw
frequencies of remember and know responses for each level of
confidence and for each condition are shown in Table 1. These
data show that in actuality the participants made relatively few
high confidence know responses, and instead tended to report
high confidence responses as remember responses. Nonetheless
even if this phenomenon is less common than the received wis-
dom would have us believe, these few responses might nonetheless
be accurate. To test this we plotted the ROC (see Figure 6) for
remember and know responses separately for each condition. This
enables us the compute a d ′ value for each level of confidence (see
Table 2). The results show that high confidence know responses
fall on the diagonal indicating that these recognition decisions are
no more accurate than chance. In contrast less confident know
responses are more accurate than chance. It seems that given the
choice of reporting a high confidence recognition decision as rec-
ollection or as familiarity the participants in this experiment opted
for recollection.
EXPERIMENT 2
An obvious question is whether recollection and familiarity differ
in how they encode context. We examined this issue in Experiment
2 by asking participants to identify the contexts associated with
recognized faces. If recollection encodes context but familiarity
does not then we would expect that know responses would result
in poor accuracy in identifying study contexts. On the other hand
if both recollection and familiarity differ only in terms of sig-
nal strength then the identification of contexts should be good
for both responses. We also ask whether the retrieval of con-
text is associated with different levels of confidence. Specifically
whether know responses made with high confidence are associ-
ated with more accurate context judgments than lower confidence
judgments. Such a result would be problematic for the standard
dual-process model in which context is associated only with recol-
lection, but is predicted by the recent model described by Wixted
and Mickes (2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-eight members of the University of Nottingham community
volunteered for this experiment. Twenty-nine were female and 19
were male. Their average age was 21.35 years (SD= 1.84). All had
normal or corrected vision.
Procedure
The procedure for the study phase was identical to that of Experi-
ment 1. There was no interval between study and test. During the
test period participants were presented with a face without any
context item. They then responded whether it was old or new by
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Table 2 | Mean sensitivity for sure and fairly sure confidence responses for remember and know responses and for each condition in
Experiment 1.
Old face–old scene vs. new
face–switched scene
Old face–switched scene vs.
new face–switched scene
Old face–new scene vs.
new face new scene
Remember Know Remember Know Remember Know
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
Sure 1.59 0.08 0.20 0.08 1.31 0.08 −0.04 0.09 1.53 0.08 −0.16 0.10
Fairly sure 1.17 0.06 0.52 0.12 1.05 0.05 0.30 0.14 1.29 0.07 0.33 0.10
Table 3 | Showing the mean proportions of hits and false alarms for
each subjective report of remembering in Experiment 2.
Remember Know Total
M SE M SE M SE
Hits 0.48 0.03 0.32 0.02 0.79 0.01
False alarms 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01
Sensitivity (d ′) 2.10 0.08 0.96 0.10 2.29 0.10
Criterion (c) 1.09 0.05 1.05 0.07 0.31 0.05
clicking on one of 12 buttons. Each was labeled 1–6 counting out
from “don’t know” in the center to “sure-new” and “sure-old” at
either side of the screen. The levels of confidence response was
increased from three in Experiment 1 so that separate ROC plots
could be calculated for remember and know judgments with suffi-
cient power and reliability. If participants responded using one of
the six old buttons they were then asked to provide a remember-
know judgment. Four scenes were then presented: the correct old
scene with three novel scenes for old trials and four novel scenes
for foil trials.
Stimuli
The study items consisted of the same faces and scenes used in
Experiment 1. During the study phase they were presented as 48
study face-scene pairs. The test items consisted of faces from the
study period (old items) and an additional 48 novel faces (new
items). The 4AFC items were composed of the study scenes (for
old items) and novel scenes.
RESULTS
The average response rates for each item type and the resulting
measures of sensitivity and criterion are shown in Table 3. The d ′
values computed over responses reported as remember judgments
were more sensitive than those computed over know responses,
t (47)= 7.55, SD= 1.04, p< 0.01, but there was no difference in
criterion (c) placement, t (47)< 1.0.
The slope of zROC plots for recognition responses did not
differ from 1, ball= 0.76, SE= 0.09, t (47)=−0.25, p> 0.05 and
there was no quadratic component bˆ2all = −0.36, SE= 0.23,
t (47)=−0.15, p> 0.05. The ROC plots for remember and know
responses were then calculated separately and are shown in
Figure 7. The slope of the regression coefficient for “remem-
ber” responses was reliably less than 1, bremember= 0.71, SE= 0.07,
t (47)= 4.49, p< 0.01, but not for“know”responses, bknow= 1.13,
SE= 0.08, t (47)= 1.70, p> 0.05. The two slopes were reliably dif-
ferent from one another, t (47)= 4.04, SE= 0.11, p< 0.01, suggest-
ing that remember-know judgments are representing something
independent of confidence. Neither curve showed a quadratic
component that differed reliably from 0, bˆ2remember = −0.07,
SE= 0.06, t (47)= 1.05, p> 0.05; bˆ2know = −0.17, SE= 0.11,
t (47)= 1.59, p> 0.05.
Now we turn to the question of whether recollection and famil-
iarity differ in terms of their encoding of context. If recollection
encodes context but familiarity does not then we expect that 4AFC
accuracy for context should be close to chance for recognition
judgments associated with “know” responses and highly accurate
for judgments given a remember “response.” However, although
4AFC accuracy was reliably greater for “remember” than “know”
responses, M = 0.87, SE= 0.02 vs. M = 0.71, SE= 0.02, respec-
tively: t (46)= 6.90, p< 0.01, 4AFC accuracy was reliably greater
than chance even for familiarity, t (46)= 19.60, p< 0.01.
We therefore examined the accuracy of context judgments for
each level of confidence and each subjective report of remembering
(see Table 4 and Figure 8). The data reveal that context judgments
are significantly above chance for each level of confidence for both
remember and know responses. This pattern demonstrates that
there is a relationship between confidence and context recollec-
tion even when no remember response is made. A traditional
threshold dual-process model cannot explain this and although
the Wixted and Mickes model can accommodate it this requires
the assumption of partially correlated familiarity and recollection
systems.
DISCUSSION
The butcher-on-the-bus has long been used as a rhetorical device
to illustrate how context can dissociate recognition based on famil-
iarity and recognition based on recollection. We show that the
rhetorical device can be reproduced as a real laboratory phenom-
enon using the stimuli on which it is based. However, our analyses
show that the effect cannot be fully explained by either traditional
threshold dual-process accounts or univariate signal detection.
That is, the phenomenon does not neatly discriminate between
models of recognition memory. Patterns of target recognition in
both experiments pose a problem for the dual-process account as
it does not predict low confidence remember responses, nor the
reliable linear relationship found between remember hits and false
alarms in zROCs. This is particularly problematic in Experiment
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FIGURE 7 | Receiver operating characteristics for remember and know
responses in Experiment 2. (A) shows the average ROC and (B) shows
the z-transform.
1 where reinstating context significantly alters the slope of the
corresponding zROC without any quadratic component being
evident. This suggests a continuous underlying system(s) such
as signal detection, where the additional contextual information
acts as a cue which increases signal strength across the scale’s entire
range. However, when separate plots are created for remember and
know in Experiment 2, the univariate account fails as it cannot
explain the reliable difference in slopes that show an underlying
dichotomy along the whole confidence scale.
FIGURE 8 | Recognition accuracy of context scenes at each level of
confidence for remember and know responses.
Context accuracy analysis in Experiment 2 leads to a similar
conclusion whereby neither SDT nor threshold models are sup-
ported. Threshold models can potentially explain above chance
source memory for know responses, as presentation of the scene
itself means the task arguably becomes a secondary recognition
task rather than true recollection resulting purely from seeing the
paired face. This would enable a familiarity system to increase cor-
rect responding. However, these models cannot explain the linear
correlation between confidence and context accuracy for remem-
ber responses. In addition, the univariate account cannot explain
the differences in accuracy for remember and know responses
which are independent of item recognition confidence.
On balance it seems that the data presented here supports
neither the traditional threshold based dual-process models nor
traditional univariate signal detection. After 30 years the butcher-
on-the-bus phenomenon can still reveal more about the nature of
human memory. We feel that it reveals the existence of two orthog-
onal signal detection systems that have a summative relationship
with recognition decisions. Although multiple memory system
models are notoriously controversial there has nonetheless been
a recent swell of evidence and support in the literature (Rotello
et al., 2004; Wixted and Stretch, 2004; Wixted, 2007; Wixted and
Mickes, 2010).
An important limiting factor on the interpretation of out
experiments is the number of trials that were available to obtain
parameter estimates of the ROC. Typically far more items are
used in recognition memory experiments using words as stim-
uli than we were able to use in our experiments. Indeed Yonelinas
and Parks (2007) note that between 50 and 60 items per con-
dition are needed to reliable parameter estimates. Experimental
preparations differ slightly for experiments involving either face
recognition or subjective reports of remembering. Face recogni-
tion experiments often use fewer items than are typically used in
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Table 4 | Distributions of responses for each level of confidence and each item type in Experiment 2.
Confidence Lure Target Correct context Incorrect context
Remember Know New Remember Know New Remember Know Remember Know
1 2 45 47 10 84 94 9 53 1 31
2 2 45 47 11 113 144 9 73 2 40
3 8 44 52 22 125 228 18 86 4 39
4 2 30 32 50 173 321 38 127 12 46
5 4 23 27 87 119 283 66 88 21 31
6 8 6 14 927 107 1015 834 85 93 22
word recognition (e.g., Chan et al., 2011) and estimates of rec-
ollection and familiarity from subjective reports of remembering
are themselves sensitive to the number of items to be remembered
(Cary and Reder, 2003). Thus when in our Experiment 1 we sought
to replicate a study that combined subjective reports of remem-
bering and face recognition (Gruppuso et al., 2007) we used fewer
items than might otherwise have been desirable to obtain ROC
parameter estimates. If we had applied this criterion to our exper-
iment there would have been a minimum of 480 trials which would
not have been a replication of the experiment that we intended.
Nonetheless this weakness would only seem to apply to the absence
of detectable quadratic components in the zROC, and not at all
to the effects of context on the subjective reports of remembering,
or on the calculations of sensitivity across the different levels of
confidence.
The recognition memory experiments overwhelmingly use
words as stimuli because the characteristics of words that affect
encoding and retrieval such as frequency and concreteness are
well documented and this allows experiments to be conducted
with carefully controlled stimuli. Indeed research that addresses
very similar issues to those asked here has been conducted using
words as stimuli (Wixted and Mickes, 2010; Ingram et al., 2012).
Indeed the dual-process vs. single-process theoretical framework
is derived almost entirely from word recognition (for reviews see
Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas and Parks, 2007). The research reported
here is intended to complement this body of knowledge by demon-
strating that its findings are relevant in the domain that originally
formed the basis of the field itself.
One final important issue is how we should interpret recog-
nition responses that in our Experiment 2 participants reported
as being based on familiarity (i.e., knowing), but which are also
accompanied with a the retrieval of accurate contextual details.
This is an issue at the heart of the recognition memory literature
and in theoretical terms at least, defines the distinction between
recollection and familiarity-based memory. The traditional view
is that recollection encodes context (or is defined by the retrieval
of contextual details) and familiarity does not. There are there-
fore three possible interpretations of our data. One possibility is
that know responses were “contaminated” by recollection-based
memory, presumably because the participants failed to follow
or understand the instructions. We feel that this explanation is
unlikely because we used a modification of the standard instruc-
tions and was precisely the hypothesis that we set out to test. Indeed
it only makes sense to talk about contamination of familiarity with
recollection if one adopts a dual-process perspective. The second
is that the two processes are not separate processes at all. This
interpretation too seems unlikely on the basis of the weight and
diversity of evidence for some separation of processes. The third is
that recollection and familiarity-based memory processes are not
exclusively defined by the encoding of contextual information.
Indeed, similar studies point to processes that are distinguished
separate dimensions or signals that contribute to a recognition
response (Wixted and Mickes, 2010; Ingram et al., 2012). Alter-
natively we may have observed the accurate context memory for
items that had been attributed as familiarity-based is because we
used a forced-choice procedure and so may have elicited knowl-
edge that may not have been revealed in less sensitive tests of source
memory such as recall.
CONCLUSION
In summary it seems that the weight of evidence from this
study as well as other behavioral and neuroscience investiga-
tions points to two underlying processes. However, the data does
not fit threshold models or those which assume exclusive pri-
oritizing of one process over the other. Instead it seems these
results can only be explained by orthogonal signal detection sys-
tems, which have an integrative relationship toward the eventual
recognition response. A model that has properties of the sort
described by Wixted and Mickes (2010) appears to explain the
relevant empirical data and the data reported here, although this
requires an assumption of partial collinearity between processes
to do so.
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